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By Patrick Barry
Rhetorical Repetition
Journalists and schoolteachers mean well, 
but they can be fatally bossy. One of their 
strangely arbitrary rules forbids us to use the 
same word twice on the same page. Thus they 
drive us to the thesaurus in desperate searches 
for far-fetched synonyms and substitutes.
— Ursula K. Le Guin, 
Steering the Craft (1998)1
ust because you have used a 
word doesn’t mean you can’t 
use it again, perhaps even in 
the same sentence. Marketers 
understand this point well. The repetition 
of the word Vegas in the city’s promotional 
slogan “What happens in Vegas, stays in 
Vegas” is not an accident. Nor is the repeti­
tion used by two companies that likely sell 
a lot of drinks there:
Hennessy: Never stop. Never settle.
Heineken:  Open your mind.  
Open your world.
Yet when it comes to selling ideas—
whether to judges, to boardrooms, or even 
just to colleagues—many lawyers shy away 
from repetition. They remain committed 
to the idea, often developed in college, that 
good writing is associated with having (and 
showing) a big vocabulary. They mistak­
enly think that the best thesaurus wins.
This prejudice is not limited to law, nor is 
it particularly new. In the first decades of the 
twentieth century, the renowned lexicog­
rapher Henry Watson Fowler complained 
about a phenomenon he called, sarcastically, 
“elegant variation”: overusing synonyms on 
the misguided belief that variety beats clar­
ity. “It is the second­rate writers,” he wrote 
in A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, 
“those intent on expressing themselves pret­
tily rather than on conveying their meaning 
clearly, & still more those whose notions of 
style are based on a few misleading rules 
of thumb, that are chiefly open to the allure­
ment of elegant variation.”2 Below is one of 
his examples:
Rarely does the “Little Summer” linger 
until November, but at times its stay has 
been prolonged until quite late in the year’s 
penultimate month.3
There’s no need to reidentify Novem­
ber as the year’s penultimate month in that 
sentence. It would be like saying, “What 
happens in Vegas, stays in that city.” The 
synonym is unnecessary, even confusing.
These types of pitfalls help explain why 
language maven Bryan Garner calls elegant 
variation “inelegant variation.”4 “Variety for 
variety’s sake in word choice can confuse 
readers,” he writes in his own Fowler­like 
usage dictionary, Garner’s Modern English 
Usage. “If you write about a person’s ‘can­
dor’ in one sentence and ‘honesty’ in the 
next, is the reader to infer that you are dis­
tinguishing between two traits, or using dif­
ferent words to refer to the same one?”5 The 
answer is not immediately clear.
The stakes are even higher, Garner notes, 
in legal writing, in which one maxim of in­
terpretation states that “if different words 
are used, different meanings must have 
been intended.”6 Here is one of the un­
reformed examples he gives in his more 
law­specific usage dictionary, Garner’s Dic-
tionary of Legal Usage:
State law makes no provisions for man-
datory autopsies, which means that jus-
tices of the peace follow different policies 
for seeking post-mortems.7
The words autopsies and post-mortems are 
meant to indicate the same thing, but the 
switch in terminology injects some unhelp­
ful ambiguity into the sentence. A similar 
hiccup occurs in a second example:
Lawyers generally have a bad reputation; 
today the American public holds a grudge 
against the half-million counselors who 
handle its legal affairs.
Is a lawyer the same as a counselor ? Given 
the sentence’s imprecision, readers can be 
forgiven for not being sure.
Awkward repetition: An example
I don’t mean to imply that repetition is 
always preferred. One of the most frequent 
comments I write in the briefs I edit is “awk­
ward repetition.” A pair of sentences from 
an appellate brief written by a student in 
the University of Michigan Unemployment 
Insurance Clinic offers a good starting point. 
The first sentence in the pair highlights that 
a supervisor named Mr. Harve pledged to 
address the sexual harassment that the stu­
dent’s client had been enduring from co­
workers. Note the student’s use of the phrase 
take care of the situation:
Mr. Harve promised he would take care 
of the situation.
The problem is that the student repeats the 
same phrase in the very next sentence:
Mr. Harve promised he would take care 
of the situation. He said he would wait at 
the workstation at the start of the shift 
the next day and “take care of the situation 
so the abuse never happened again.”
That’s awkward. It’s almost as if the student 
wrote the second sentence without remem­
bering the words she put in the first one.
Here’s a different approach:
Mr. Harve promised he would take care 
of the situation. He said he would wait at 
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the workstation at the start of the shift 
the next day and make sure that “the 
abuse never happened again.”
This edit eliminates the awkward repeti­
tion. It has the added benefit of condensing 
the quotation, a step that lets readers focus 
on a tidier passage of text. That’s usually a 
good thing. Nobody wants to read words 
they don’t need to, especially those they 
have already read.
Awkward repetition:  
Another example
Awkward repetition can contaminate 
not just pairs of sentences but single sen­
tences as well. The example comes from a 
cover letter written by a law student seek­
ing an internship at the SEC. You don’t 
need to read the whole sentence to spot 
the problem:
In law school, I have enjoyed my law 
school classes . . . .
That’s redundant—and also a bit jarring. 
There’s no reason to include law school a 
second time. The phrase doesn’t add any­
thing new or helpful. It just takes up space.
To his credit, the student quickly real­
ized his mistake once I asked him to read 
the sentence aloud. He took out my law 
school and just went with “In law school, I 
have enjoyed classes such as. . .” That im­
proved things considerably.
It also reinforced, for me, a lesson to pass 
on to all my students: among the many ben­
efits of reading your writing aloud, it can 
help you distinguish between awkward rep­
etition and rhetorical repetition. By now, 
it’s probably clear that by “rhetorical repeti­
tion” I mean those intentional bits of rep­
etition that add helpful rhythm and force to 
your words.
Anaphora is the term for repetition that 
comes at the beginning of successive sen­
tences, phrases, or clauses. Here’s Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor using it in an impas­
sioned dissent:
Race matters to a young man’s view of so-
ciety when he spends his teenage years 
watching others tense up as he passes, no 
matter the neighborhood where he grew 
up. Race matters to a young woman’s sense 
of self when she states her hometown, and 
then is pressed, “No, where are you really 
from?”, regardless of how many genera-
tions her family has been in the country. 
Race matters to a young person addressed 
by a stranger in a foreign language, which 
he does not understand because only 
English was spoken at home. Race mat-
ters because of the slights, the snickers, 
the silent judgments that reinforce that 
most crippling of thoughts: “I do not 
belong here.”8 (Emphasis on “really” in 
the original.)
Epistrophe, on the other hand, is the 
term for intentional repetition that comes at 
the end of successive sentences, phrases, or 
clauses. One of the more famous Supreme 
Court opinions of all time, McCulloch v 
Maryland, has a good example courtesy of 
Chief Justice John Marshall:
If any one proposition could command 
the universal assent of mankind, we might 
expect it would be this—that the Gov-
ernment of the Union, though limited in 
its powers, is supreme within its sphere 
of action. This would seem to result nec-
essarily from its nature. It is the Gov-
ernment of all; its powers are delegated 
by all; it represents all, and acts for all.9
Some students have a hard time remem­
bering the word anaphora. Others have a 
hard time remembering epistrophe. Both, to 
me, sound more like the names of perfumes 
than they do the names of writing moves I’d 
want to use. So I tend to teach each of them 
under the broad banner of the term I used 
before: rhetorical repetition.
But if the lexical precision of anaphora 
and epistrophe works for you, definitely 
stick with them. They may help you re­
member that rhetorical repetition can work 
well at the beginning of a construction, at 
the end of a construction, and sometimes 
even at both the beginning and the end of 
a construction, as advertising legend David 
Ogilvy shows in the sentence below:
A special problem with the employees 
of an advertising agency is that each one 
watches the other one very carefully to see 
if one gets a carpet before the other, to 
see if one has an assistant before the other, 
or to see if one makes an extra nickel be-
fore the other.10
To help give you a sense of the compo­
sitional choices available, below are several 
examples of skillful uses of rhetorical rep­
etition. The set begins, however, with a few 
instances of awkward repetition so that you 
can start to notice the difference.
There isn’t always an easy way to articu­
late what distinguishes rhetorical repetition 
from awkward repetition, but one step is to 
ask: Did the writer do this on purpose? If 
you don’t think they did, that’s a pretty good 
sign of awkward repetition, especially if the 
words sound clumsy when read aloud.
This means that what Justice Potter 
Stewart famously said of obscenity, using 
his own brand of rhetorical repetition—“I 
know it when I see it”11—might also, in a 
slightly modified form, serve as a good stan­
dard for catching awkward repetition: “I 
know it when I hear it.”
Awkward repetition:  
Still more examples
 1.  “Both restrictions are both quite broad.”
  —Memo by first-year law student (2017)
 2.  “In applying the susceptibility standard, 
we need to learn if Shrecklich was aware 
of Cindy’s susceptibilities and whether his 
comments were intended to address them. 
Two facts address this issue.”
  —Memo by first-year law student (2017)
 3.  “It is clear that there is still a lot of work 
that needs to be done. Vacant buildings, 
crime, and foreclosures still exist.”
  — Cover letter by first-year  
law student (2017)
Rhetorical repetition: Examples
 1.  “They knew what emergencies were, knew 
the pressures they engender for authorita-
tive action, knew, too, how they afford a 
ready pretext for usurpation.”
  — Justice Robert Jackson, Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer (1952)12
 2.  “We did not know how many survivors 
wanted us to represent them. We did not 
know how many of the survivors would 
be seeking compensation for the death 
of family or relatives, how many would 
be seeking recovery only for lost cars or 
houses, how many would be seeking re-
covery for injuries. We didn’t even know 
whom to sue.”
  — Gerald Stern, The Buffalo Creek 
Disaster (1976)13
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 3.  “Under the present law, for example, it 
will be the CLEO [“chief law enforcement 
officer”] and not some federal official 
who stands between the gun purchaser and 
immediate possession of his gun. And it 
will likely be the CLEO, not some fed-
eral official, who will be blamed for any 
error (even one in the designated federal 
database) that causes a purchaser to be 
mistakenly rejected.”
  — Justice Antonin Scalia, Printz v  
United States (1997)14
 4.  “The beginnings of confusion with us in 
England are at present feeble enough, but 
with you in France we have seen an even 
more feeble infancy growing rapidly into 
a strength to heap mountains on moun-
tains and to wage war with heaven itself. 
When our neighbour’s house is on fire it 
can’t be wrong to have the fire-engines 
to play a little on our own. Better to be 
despised for undue anxiety than ruined by 
undue confidence.”
  — Edmund Burke, Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (1790)15
 5.  “It is a peculiar sensation, this double-
consciousness, this sense of always look-
ing at one’s self through the eyes of others, 
of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a 
world that looks on in amused contempt 
and pity. One ever feels his twoness,—
an American, a Negro; two souls, two 
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two 
warring ideals in one dark body, whose 
dogged strength alone keeps it from being 
torn asunder.”
  — W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of  
Black Folk (1903)16 n
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The Contest Returns!
No doubt loyal readers have been yearning for the contest to reappear. And here 
it is, after a long hiatus.
At the moment, I’m in the thick of helping to “restyle” (redraft) the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy. This will be the fifth—and last—of the five sets of federal rules to be 
redrafted from top to bottom for greater clarity and consistency, without changing 
substantive meaning. The previous four were, in order, appellate, criminal, civil, and 
evidence.
In my view, the single greatest improvement in the restyled civil rules, which took 
effect in December 2007, was the much greater use of headings and subheadings. 
If fact, we more than doubled their number, from 359 to 757. As I said in the Janu-
ary column, “Headings are critical navigational tools for readers.”
With that in mind, try your hand at this provision:
(a)  General Right to Amend. A voluntary petition list, schedule, or statement 
may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before 
the case is closed. The debtor shall give notice of the amendment to the 
trustee and to any entity affected thereby. On motion of a party in interest, 
after notice and a hearing, the court may order any voluntary petition, list, 
schedule, or statement to be amended and the clerk shall give notice of the 
amendment to entities designated by the court.
My suggestions:
(1)  Try to create two subsections with parallel subheadings. Even a short pro-
vision can be improved in that way.
(2) Use the active voice in the one sentence that doesn’t.
(3)  Break up the longish last sentence (and you’ll gain another kind of 
parallelism).
(4) Get rid of shall.
This exercise shouldn’t be terribly challenging, but it might be eye-opening.
I’ll send a free book to the first two persons who send me an “A” revision. You can 
choose either Seeing Through Legalese: More Essays on Plain Language or (for the 
young at heart or those with youngsters) my kids’ book Mr. Mouthful Learns His Les-
son. Send your revision to kimblej@cooley.edu. The deadline is October 19.
